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Let’s assume... ‘research performed in ignorance of the understanding that 
implementation actors themselves have about their circumstances is likely to miss 
important parts of the explanation for what happened’ (O’Toole 2000: 269).  
 
INTRODUCTION – A THEORETICAL PREFACE 
 
The study of implementation has had tremendous importance for the study of policy. It 
opened up the black box of ‘after-a-formal-decision’ politics and demonstrated, among 
other things, that the political process continues all the way through to the final output of 
the policy process (Bardach 1977). It addressed the complexity of achieving policy goals, 
offered new insights into the importance of lower-level actors in policy, and attended to 
the effects that clients and extra-government groups had on the policy result (Schofield 
2001). It became one of the most important sources for the development of new 
perspectives that tried to capture how policy processes cross the public-private divide, as 
evidenced by the new focus on governance (Rhodes 1997) or networks (Marin and 
Mayntz 1991). Implementation research has been particularly valuable in two somewhat 
contradictory ways. On the one hand it has shown how difficult it is for new values, ideas 
or interests to be implemented within governmental structures that are shaped to maintain 
a status quo. On the other hand, it has pointed to the complexities of policy 
implementation even when conflicts are not apparent – to a range of ‘policy paradoxes’ 
where the outcome is obscure because of an initial and mutual adherence to a policy goal 
among all the actors involved (Pressman and Wildawsky 1973). The case study we 
present in this chapter is illustrative of both these insights. 
 
For some reason, implementation research seemed to become unfashionable during most 
of the 1990s (Sætren 2005). This is unfortunate, as it does not seem to mirror a decreased 
demand for the practical insights offered by this research (Lester and Goggin 1998; 
O’Toole 2000). Recently, however, there have been signs of a revival of interest in 
implementation studies (Barrett 2004; DeLeon 1999; Hill and Hupe 2002; Lester and 
Goggin 1998; Peters and Pierre 2003; Sætren 2005; Schofield 2001; Winter 1999). This 
has led to an emerging debate on how to revitalize the implementation approach.  
 
How to define and study policy implementation – some general ideas 
 
This chapter builds on the rich literature on implementation that has developed since the 
topic started to attract scholarly attention in the early 1970s. The richness of this literature 
relies on its large repertoire of findings, perspectives and policy ideas. From this resource 
we have extracted four ideas, which have guided this study:  
1. We adhere to the ‘relaxed’ definition of implementation suggested by Ferman (1990) 
as that which happens between policy expectations and policy result. In line with this 
  
interpretation we define our study – of how a municipal government declared its 
expectation that a new city by-law would be adopted, which never happened – as a 
case of a failed policy implementation. 
2. Policy implementation can be perceived as a ‘negotiated order’ (Bardach 1977), 
necessitating a focus on the political processes through which such orders are 
established, maintained and changed (O’Toole and Montjoy 1984).  
3. Implementation usually implies the involvement of different organizational units, and 
requires an exploration of inter-organizational relations and inter-institutional 
linkages (O’Toole and Montjoy 1984) as well as a focus on the organizational 
cultures (Barrett 2004). 
4. Policy implementation may be viewed as problem-solving, necessitating a focus on 
organizational learning processes. This requires exploring how learning takes place – 
or is inhibited – within and across organizational units (Schofield 2001, 2004). 
 
THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
This chapter reports on research initiated in response to a question: Why has it taken so 
long, and proven so difficult, to implement a Solar Water Heater By-law (SWHB) in the 
City of Cape Town (CCT)? 
 
The decision by the CCT to implement a SWHB was, in several people’s words, a ‘no 
brainer’, because its implementation would enable a significant group of people to 
continue enjoying the same levels of heated water supply at a lower cost, while reducing 
carbon emissions within the city. It would be a win-win situation.  
 
Yet, although there was much enthusiasm for the SWHB, and although work began in 
earnest on its development in 2006, by the end of 2010 there was still no by-law.  
 
The context in which the by-law was meant to be implemented seemed generally 
supportive:  
§ The CCT has repeatedly declared its intention to pass a SWHB, first in its 2003 
‘Integrated Metropolitan Environmental Policy’ and later, in 2006, in its 
comprehensive ‘Energy and Climate Change Strategy’ (CCT 2003, 2006). 
§ There was, and continues to be, considerable political support, locally and 
provincially, for carbon reduction initiatives.  
§ The CCT has, according to a reliable legal opinion, a constitutional mandate to pass, 
and implement, a SWHB (De Visser 2008). 
§ There remains considerable support across a wide swathe of City officials for the 
City’s sustainability objectives.1 
§ By-laws are an established and accepted mechanism for regulating the behaviour of 
  
city residents and are an oft-used mechanism within the CCT. 
§ There are international precedents for using SWHBs as a way of achieving 
sustainability objectives – for instance, the City of Barcelona passed a SWHB in 




First, a word about our research and its limitations. In order to explore our research 
question we conducted a ‘surgical’ enquiry in which we focused our attention on those 
departments within the City that had been engaged most directly with the SWHB – the 
Environmental Resource and Management Department (ERMD) and the Planning and 
Building Development and Management Department (PBDMD). Both departments are 
units of the Strategy and Planning Directorate (SPD). Within the SPD, the ERMD is 
responsible for promoting sustainability within the City and took the lead in the SWHB 
process. The PBDMD, as the department responsible for planning and building 
regulations, was consulted at various stages in the process and was identified by the 
ERMD as the appropriate implementing agency for the by-law. There were, of course, 
other departments within the City that had an influence on the by-law process, such as the 
Finance Department. However, given the limited nature of our enquiry we excluded these 
departments from our investigation.  
 
Our research was premised on the assumption that, collectively, officials within these two 
departments (hereafter ‘our departments’) already knew much about the solution to our 
puzzle and that our task was to tease out this knowledge and test our conclusions with 
them. To clarify the political context, we met with a member of the City Council who has 
been heavily engaged in the by-law process.  
 
On the basis of both our initial enquiries and conclusions drawn by research reported 
within implementation and governance literatures, we focused our attention on the 
institutional cultures of the ERMD and the PBDMD, particularly on the ways in which 
these cultures encouraged officials to understand, and respond to, the ‘worlds’ within 
which they operate.  
 
Before proceeding further, a word of caution is in order. While we will speak about 
institutional cultures that apply to each of these departments collectively, this is 
inevitably a simplification, as how an institutional culture manifests itself varies across 
any organization. Accordingly, our description of both departments will inevitably be a 
caricature. Nonetheless, identifying an institutional culture does throw considerable light 





Kenneth Burke, the American literary theorist, argued that the way people understand 
their worlds inevitably excludes other ways of seeing. He expressed this in the phrase 
‘every way of seeing is also a way of not seeing’ (1935: 70) or, as he phrased it some 
fifty years later, ‘every insight contains its own special kind of blindness’ (1984: 41). 
Different institutional cultures provide for different sets of insights, as well as different 
‘blindnesses’.  
 
What turned out to be crucial in differentiating our departments was not a difference with 
respect to ends – they both were committed to promoting a ‘greener city’ – but rather 
their understanding of the most appropriate means for achieving this. This confirms a 
common finding within the organizational literature, where researchers have repeatedly 
found that a consensus over ends often breaks down when it comes to decisions about the 
best means to realize these ends (see, for example, Pressman and Wildawsky 1973).  
 
These differences over means often make it difficult for units within organizations to 
work cooperatively to design and implement initiatives. In order to clarify these 
differences we explored the institutional culture of each department in terms of several 
dimensions: 
§ a preferred normative orientation or rationality; 
§ a preferred implementation pathway – that is, a preferred set of means for realizing 
policy objectives; 
§ a preferred learning context – that is, where officials preferred to look for advice and 
learning; and finally 
§ a preferred temporal horizon – that is, a preferred, and expected, time frame for 
implementation. 
 
Together these dimensions defined the main features of our departments’ institutional 
cultures. As we have already suggested, there is variation along these dimensions 
between the departmental officials and, while we recognize this, what we have sought to 
capture in our analysis are the means around which this variation takes place.  
 
THE ERMD -- THE ‘DRIVERS’  
 
Preferred normative orientation 
 
The ERMD sees itself, and is seen by others, as the department responsible for protecting 
the environment and realizing sustained environmental value within the SPD.  
In the contest for ‘service delivery’ priorities and associated fiscal resources, the ERMD 
  
is of the view that, across the CCT, municipal policies and practices tend to discount 
environmental value, resulting in an unsustainable development pathway. Given this 
context, the department sees itself as overseeing a necessary process of change so as to 
bring environmental value into the mainstream of city decision-making. In the ERMD’s 
understanding, it is necessary that a green constituency be established in its sister 
departments, especially those within its own directorate.  
 
The ERMD, like environmental departments in many of the world’s cities, is sometimes 
without the political clout to oversee the changes that it sees as being important. Further, 
the department is aware that constitutional framings constrain what environmental 
interventions can be initiated at local municipal levels. It also recognizes that, within the 
City, top-down policy implementation tends to take priority over bottom-up initiatives. 
For these reasons the department expects to have to work to overcome these barriers and 




Based on its understanding that a replication of business as usual is not possible given the 
local environmental constraints, the ERMD sees the need for changes in lifestyles and 
their associated ‘rituals of comfort’ (Braithwaite 2008: 155). It recognizes that people 
will often be reluctant to make these changes voluntarily. Within this context, municipal 
by-laws are regarded as a useful regulatory mechanism for achieving behavioural 
changes. As one ERMD official noted: 
…we as humans, and as institutions, don’t like change… it is a 
little bit uncomfortable and it requires a bit of effort… But if you 
get that law through, people will adjust to it. They will shift and 




An important feature of the ERMD’s approach to strategy development has been to 
monitor environmental interventions globally, and to use this learning as a source of 
insight in developing its own policy stances. This learning explains the department’s 
identification of the SWHB as an attractive and innovative policy option to initiate 
change in the City. This option’s usefulness had been demonstrated internationally, 
particularly in Spain. While the by-law they envisaged would only apply to new 
residential dwellings and renovations, it would, nonetheless, have a significant (albeit 






The ERMD is staffed by committed civil servants who are dedicated to operating a 
proactive department that makes a significant difference in promoting environmental 
values within the CCT. Given the ERMD’s conception of the magnitude and urgency of 
environmental challenges, their view is that interventions ought to achieve significant and 
immediate impacts. Thus, an important orientation of the department is to identify ‘low-
hanging fruit’ – strategic interventions – that will achieve quick environmental victories. 
In its view, the SWHB met this criterion.  
 
Putting it all together: changes to business as usual 
 
The ERMD sees itself as operating within a system that is not only unsustainable but also 
difficult to change. Officials in the department have identified three primary sets of 
barriers that disrupt their capacity to promote a greener city: institutional obstacles, 
problematic incentives, and a conflict of private and public interests.    
 
Although it does recognize the importance of establishing mechanisms to monitor 
compliance with the City’s established priorities and goals, the department perceives 
institutional structures as often interfering with and frustrating environmental initiatives. 
These constraints are, for instance, embedded in the CCT’s financial systems and its 
often ‘green-unfriendly’ audit requirements. One example would be the manner in which 
financial accounting arrangements ignore environmental costs in ways that tend not to 
favour longer-term projects. A related example is the established value hierarchy within 
the City; in processes that attempt to balance objectives, green agendas are currently 
trumped by other agendas.  
 
Similarly, the ERMD perceives the current internal incentive systems within the CCT as 
unsupportive of its mandate, as many environmental considerations do not appear 
prominently in internal mechanisms such as ‘scorecards’ used to measure the 
performance of officials. 
I think the incentive to do things in a new way does not exist. You 
find that scorecards do not measure innovativeness. So long as 
you spend so much of your money.  
Central to these concerns is the perception that key objectives of the CCT’s Integrated 
Development Plan (IDP), such as the goals of energy saving and energy efficiency, have 
not yet been integrated into the internal performance scorecard mechanism. As a result, 
projects like the SWHB are not promoted.  
 
To remove these and similar barriers requires the restructuring of institutions within the 
  
City, for example the restructuring of scorecards so that they better reflect the IDP’s 
objectives.  
 
One concern expressed was that, within the SPD itself, the predominant attitude tends to 
emphasize established routines and standard operating procedures rather than the 
innovation that promoting a green objective would require. One consequence of this 
attitude, it was argued, is that officials de-prioritize anything that is not within their 
formal mandate or job description – their preference is to stick to what they are 
comfortable with (Braithwaite’s ‘rituals of comfort’) and to avoid introducing any new 
routes, especially ones that might create problems. This attitude, as the ERMD sees it, is 
incompatible with the need for urgent change:  
… nobody is prepared to say, ‘well, yes, let’s make a difference, 
let’s make a change, let’s improve the lot of the city’ … ‘I do my 
job, I sign off on those plans, don’t give me anything extra to do’ 
… So, they will feel annoyed at me if they feel I’m treading on 
their territory or telling them what to do with their business, if 
that makes sense… 
 
Despite having to operate on a challenging institutional terrain, the ERMD feels that it 
has succeeded in putting environmental issues firmly on the agenda of the SPD. 
However, the work has been time-consuming, often exhausting, and its impact has varied 
considerably. Sometimes, as with the greening of municipal buildings, there have been 
significant successes. At other times, as in the case of the SWHB, gains have not been 
made despite much effort and dedication on the part of the ERMD. In short, although 
feeling beleaguered, the department has managed nonetheless to achieve considerable 
gains within what is often perceived to be an unsupportive institutional environment 
within the City. 
 




The PBDMD sees itself as a highly professional planning and regulatory agency skilled 
at using a repertoire of regulatory tools. It has come to believe that careful planning is at 
the heart of successful policy implementation. The PBDMD is proud of the fact that, as a 
service delivery department, it pays attention to established procedures, as this is what 
successful and sustained delivery requires (i.e. proper systems that are properly 
executed). 
 
The PBDMD sees itself as operating within a multi-level governance environment in 
  
which it is required to implement and apply nationally established standards. Within this 
context one of its primary responsibilities involves working within, and enforcing, 
national building standards.  
 
Through its various operations, the PBDMD is infused with a normative orientation that 
might be thought of as practical rationality. Its way of acting and thinking favours a 
careful weighing of different, and often competing, goals. Process is all-important, as it is 
process that enables coordinated action within government: ‘The way our protocols work 
is that, before you can promulgate a by-law, you need to have a policy’. A central feature 
of this rationality is the importance of choosing goals and means so as to ensure that 
balance is maintained and the correct implementation routes are selected. One set of 
values should not simply trump others.  
 
As the department sees it, its role as a truly professional line department – 
professionalism is a key value for the PBDMD – should always be to ask uncomfortable 
questions about whether matters have been carefully thought through, procedures 




The attitude of the PBDMD towards legislation is that law-making is a potentially 
powerful public intervention mechanism that has to be used cautiously, with parsimony, 
and seldom as a first resort. Thus in the view of officials in this department, introducing 
by-laws that attempt to force people to engage in some desired set of actions is, almost by 
definition, something to be viewed with caution. One reason for this view is that 
enforcement processes are cumbersome and require considerable resources, and 
frequently involve substantial transaction costs. Thus, the PBDMD was wary of adopting 
a by-law route as a carbon-reduction strategy, especially as officials in the department 
believed that alternatives had not been considered adequately, and that the 
implementation costs which the SWHB would, in their view, impose on them had not 
been carefully examined. In expanding on these concerns an officer of the PBDMD 
offered a recent experience as an illustration: 
It’s only when you have grappled with bringing someone to court 
that you really understand the problems. I was just by-the-by 
involved in a building dispute with [a major South African public 
agency] in [a suburb of Cape Town]. We took probably 10 years 
to get them to fix [the problem]. And they eventually fixed it, but 
we ended up taking them to the High Court. It takes a lot of effort 
and money... The uninitiated would say ‘well just serve a notice 
and that’s the end of the problem’. It’s in fact not. It’s only the 
  
start of another process.  
 
Generally the PBDMD prefers policy interventions that, while not exclusive, often rely 
on incentives rather than coercion through legislation. For this department, incentive-
based schemes have the considerable advantage of providing the persons whose 
behaviour one wishes to shape with choice. Incentives, as the department sees it, typically 
have the not inconsiderable advantage of lower transaction costs, as they accommodate 
choice at the level of the individual. An advantage of this is that it enables governments 
to implement policies that tap into the local knowledge of citizens in a way that coercion 
through law-making, in the department’s view, seldom does. Incentive-based schemes 
may seem to take longer, but in the end will prove to be the most cost- and time-effective 
approach. 
Accordingly, for the department, the first and most crucial question to ask is: What is the 
appropriate policy approach, given the variety of means available? If a coercive legal 
means is adopted, considerable attention needs to be paid to the way the instrument is 





A significant feature of how the PBDMD conceives its objectives, opportunities and 
challenges is that it has developed a consistent spatial-temporal approach to policy 
development. This includes a sceptical attitude to what the department sees as a tendency 
to be too attracted by international ‘groundbreaking’ projects and ‘best practices’ as 
solutions to South African, and more specifically Capetonian, problems. Again, this 
expresses itself as a concern about moving too quickly to adopt a solution – as a ‘best 
practice’ – without due concern being accorded to the idiosyncrasies of the local context. 
This concern was expressed by one official in a comment he shared with us about an 
enthusiastic response to an initiative elsewhere:  
[A colleague] was now for three weeks with [a politician] in 
China. I got an email saying ‘listen when the [politician gets] 
back he wants to see a number of sites identified where they can 
put up high-rise residential developments’. You talk about 
context! Do you think that a 50-storey-high block of flats would 
be the best solution to the housing problem in Khayelitsha? 
For officials in this department local context was almost always crucial, and accordingly 





As mentioned, officials in this department expressed concerns about what they thought of 
as the all too prevalent tendency to select policy approaches without a careful 
consideration of alternatives, and of the problems that might be encountered down the 
line. This stance might be expressed as a ‘go slow to go fast’ approach. The concern was 
that a desire for ‘quick fixes’ often was equated with mitigating the necessity of 
following proper processes.  
 
In their view most policy processes, especially legislative ones, take time, as one needs to 
incorporate participatory and deliberative elements. From this point of view, pushing too 
hard for ‘quick wins’ may result in undesired outcomes. What is most often required is 
not rushing in, but rather patient analysis and careful, thought-through policy steps.  
 
Perceived barriers and regulatory opportunities  
 
As a planning and regulatory agency, the PBDMD has a clear understanding of itself as 
operating within the constraints of, and often as a local enforcer of, national and 
provincial laws and policies. Important pieces of legislation that shape the work of the 
department are the National Building Regulations and Building Regulations Standards 
Act No. 103 of 1977, and the Land Use Planning Ordinance No. 15 of 1985. Other 
related pieces of legislation are the National Environmental Management Act No. 107 of 
1998, the National Heritage Resources Act No. 25 of 1999 and the Environment 
Conservation Act No. 73 of 1989. Working within the confines of national and provincial 
legislation is conceived of as a constraining factor that sets limits on the kinds of policy 
initiatives the department may undertake.  But it is also conceived of as an enabling and 
capacity-enhancing context.  
 
The PBDMD has in-depth knowledge of the regulatory landscape within which it 
operates, and the limitations and opportunities this presents. Although the department is 
certainly hesitant about transcending what national and provincial legislation stipulate, it 
does not perceive itself simply as a passive, rule-oriented or retrospective agency. On the 
contrary, we were presented with a picture of a department seeking to be a part of 
cooperative legislative processes, attempting on the one hand to influence national 
legislation and, on the other, working to develop municipal policies and regulatory 
mechanisms within the confines of that legislation.  
 
A key feature of this department’s understanding of its regulatory responsibilities was 
that, although environmental protection should be recognized as a national domain, there 
is significant space for municipalities to be active environmental regulators, provided that 
  
they are careful not to usurp national functions.  
 
 
SUMMING UP – DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONAL CULTURES 
 
We are now in a position to draw a simplified diagram of the philosophical differences 
between our two departments with respect to how they are inclined to ‘think’ about 
policy values and interventions (Figure 1).  
 






















































which may have 
negative 
consequences in 
the long term. 
 
Given these different ways of seeing, as illustrated in Figure 1, it is not surprising that 
these two departments were often at loggerheads over the SWHB and that each one often 
experienced the other department as seeking to frustrate rather than to assist its efforts. 
 
While we believe that the caricature we have painted of each department is useful in 
drawing out differences between their operating cultures, as these were expressed in the 
SWHB processes, as with all caricatures the different orientations identified here should 
not be regarded as immutable but simply as revealing something about the pathways that 
  
were adopted in this particular initiative. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL TENSIONS IN THE SOLAR WATER HEATER BY-LAW 
PROCESS 
 
The political processes by which policy is mediated, negotiated 
and modified during its formulation continue in the behaviour of 
those involved in its implementation acting to protect or pursue 
their own values and interests. (Barrett 2004: 253) 
 
The SWHB process nicely elucidates a classical implementation paradox. In the 
implementation literature this paradox arises where there is a general agreement about the 
‘goodness’ of a policy or a value and yet implementation is stalled and sometimes even 
completely halted. Yet while, in the words of an officer of the ERMD, ‘...you will 
struggle to find anyone who will say that the Solar Water Heater by-law is viewed as a 
bad idea’, it was also stated that it ‘is probably the most extreme example of 
dysfunctionality that I’m aware of…’. 
 
So, how did each of the involved departments experience the SWHB process? What did 
the departments perceive as the major reasons for the collapse of the process? 
 
The SWHB process, as experienced by the ERMD  
 
As the ERMD perceived the by-law process, it had done most of the things that needed to 
be done correctly. Nonetheless, on reflection, officials in the department acknowledged 
that some things could, and should, have been done differently, in particular that there 
were formal routes to follow when introducing by-laws to which they ought to have paid 
more attention.  
 
As the department experienced the process, the by-law proposal was, initially, favourably 
received by all people consulted. The ERMD did not recall anybody objecting to the idea 
of the by-law as a viable, and potentially very effective, environmental intervention. In 
reflecting back on our conversations, officials pointed to the fact that there were 
important staffing changes during the process, which may have led to new views being 
introduced that were not adequately canvassed or addressed, resulting in shifting 
institutional memories.  
 
In spite of these factors, the officials with whom we discussed the by-law remained, at 
least to us, somewhat mystified by why the PBDMD had been so resistant to the by-law, 
although they acknowledged, and were sympathetic to, the resource concerns that had 
  
been expressed by their sister department. As the ERMD sees it, however, these were and 
are primarily technical problems for which it is always possible to find reasonable 
solutions – ‘if there was a will there would have been a way’.  
 
Finally, the officials we spoke to felt that, throughout the process, they had adopted a 
very conciliatory and accommodating stance in response to the concerns raised by the 
PBDMD, but met only with frustration: 
I thought ‘who are these people to be so troublesome’… We had 
another meeting with them. They had not even read the law under 
which they work… They are the planning and building 
management department. They hadn’t accurately understood the 
regulations under which they operate… 
 
The SWHB process, as experienced by the PBDMD 
 
…failed implementation is often a sensible alternative to 
successful implementation. (Lin 1996: 4) 
 
First, why did the PBDMD not support the by-law initiative? Why were the officials in 
this department such ‘troublesome people’? 
 
Secondly, how did this department define its role in the process, and how did it 
experience the interactions triggered by the by-law initiative? 
 
A feature of the PBDMD’s attitude to the by-law was that it perceived it as, potentially, 
usurping national jurisdiction. At present there are no requirements in the national 
building regulations obliging citizens to provide hot water on their premises, nor to heat 
their water in any specific way. The by-law, if it had been passed, would have prohibited 
people from occupying a new house, or a renovated home, unless the PBDMD had 
approved installation of a solar water heater. The department felt this to be a potential 
legislative conflict that would create challenging enforcement issues.  
 
A bigger concern had to do with the department’s own transaction costs. The department 
would, through its building inspectors, be the primary enforcer of the by-law and foresaw 
that the law would significantly add to its transaction costs in two ways. First, it assumed 
that the law might lead to thorny enforcement problems. As the department saw it, the 
problem was not primarily with the process of certifying that buildings were in 
compliance with the law. Rather the problem lay, for them, with its workload that would 
likely increase, in particular where enforcement was required as a result of non-
  
compliance with the law. Based on its experience as an enforcer of building regulations, 
the department knew how demanding and time-consuming it can be to compel people to 
comply with legislation with which they are unhappy.  
 
A third reason the by-law initiative met with limited enthusiasm from the PBDMD had 
more to do with how the department perceived it as an environmental intervention. The 
PBDMD undertook some calculations to estimate how many of the building plans that it 
annually approves would be affected by the by-law, and its conclusion was that this 
would amount to approximately four per cent. It realised that these were insecure 
estimates, as they were based on data that was almost ten years old. As the department 
perceived it, however, the by-law was unlikely to have a very significant green impact, 
but would certainly create significant regulatory problems. As the department perceived 
it, the by-law was just another example of an unfortunate tendency of ‘people writing 
policy in a vacuum’, as one of its officers expressed it.  
 
A final objection to the by-law was the department’s philosophy of law-making, and 
particularly coercive law-making, as a means to be used cautiously. The department felt 
that, if the SWHB was enacted, the City would be determining in advance by what means 
energy was to be saved, rather than simply setting savings standards and leaving the 
choice of means to owners.  
 
Adding to these substantial doubts about the suitability of the SWHB as a policy 
intervention, officials in the PBDMD did not experience their interaction with the ERMD 
as one in which their expertise was recognized. Moreover, they perceived their inputs as 
being generally negatively received by the ERMD.  As seen from the perspective of these 
officials, they should have been engaged in the policy-shaping process much earlier, and 
more thoroughly, rather than simply being brought on board at the end as an 
implementing agency (a perception that the ERMD disputes). The PBDMD felt they were 
presented with the by-law as a fait accompli, and only then asked for their approval.  
 
GOOD OR BAD POLICY, GOOD OR BAD IMPLEMENTATION? 
 
Neither the ERMD nor the PBDMD saw their interaction over the by-law as positive. 
What developed instead was a process characterized by antagonism and frustration. This 
was clearly related to the different philosophical positions of the two departments as to 
how goals, means, context and degree of urgency should be perceived. 
 
The essential constituents of any successful policy implementation process are goals, 
constraints and means. A model provided by Majone and Wildawsky (1978) is useful in 
understanding how differently the two departments experienced the SWHB. The model 
  
distinguishes between the suitability of a policy, perceived as either good or bad, and how 
problematic the implementation process is perceived to be, also perceived as good or bad. 
Given the dynamic relations between goals and implementation, four outcomes are 
possible (Figure 2): 
 














 GOOD BAD 
GOOD 1 2 
BAD 3 4 
Source: Majone and Wildawsky (1978) 
 
If both the policy and the implementation are good (as in cell 1 of Figure 2) all will be 
well. From the view point of the ERMD, however, the policy process ended in cell 3. In 
their view the SWHB was basically a good policy that had been constrained by bad 
implementation; hence their efforts to move the policy outcome from cell 3 to cell 1.  
 
The PBDMD, in contrast, thought that the by-law initiative was and ought to remain 
located in cell 4 – i.e. a bad policy with bad implementation. As they saw it, cell 4 was 
the appropriate cell, hence their stalling to keep the policy in cell 4. The worst result for 
them would have been if this policy had moved to cell 2, as that would mean that bad 
policy was being effective.  
  
A POLITICAL ADDENDUM 
 
To provide a political context to the processes we have outlined, we met with a member 
of City Council who has been intimately involved in the by-law process. This person 
confirmed many of our observations of the philosophical and practical differences 
between the two departments. In a comment on the ERMD, this politician stated: 
The environmentalist[s], they are very passionate people and they 
will be forever, and I don’t want them to change… Because, if 
they don’t push, technocrats won’t innovate, they follow rules. 
And if you don’t innovate then you won’t be able, or you won’t 
think of writing new rules. 
  
 
However, this politician also emphasized that it is often quite difficult to get ‘the 
environmentalists’ to acknowledge ‘some realities’:  
I don’t think that the environmentalists understand the technocrats 
and they don’t care to find out… They just want to push their 
ideas… The environmentalists also don’t want to write business 
plans. They want to argue concepts. But concepts are really 
dreams. 
 
What became increasingly clear through this discussion is that the challenges of 
implementing green politics in the CCT cannot simply be reduced to communication 
problems and their resolution. What is at stake clearly has as much to do with underlying 
regulatory obstacles as it has with communication. The problem, as conceived by this 
politician, is that each time one tries to implement a new green agenda, one immediately 
falls foul of established principles, laws and rules that maintain the established practices.  
It’s just a mess. If you’re working within a sort of living legal 
framework that’s what happens. You have to update constantly. 
[Regulations don’t] speak to each other and [they] seldom speak 
to new innovative ideas. 
This view nicely captures what happened with the SWHB. For example, as we have seen, 
planning officials argued that administrative law principles were in their view 
inconsistent with an approach, like that of the proposed by law, that left citizens with 
insufficient choice.  
 
As the politician perceived it, there is no way of avoiding such regulatory conflicts.  
The planners only want rules. So, what you want to do is set the 
rules and they obey the rules. But then again, the rule must be an 
implementable rule, it must be a rule that can really be justifiable 
and administratively fair. 
Again, as this politician sees it, when all the pieces have been carefully put in place, 
including national technical standards and national direction, the SWHB will be able to 
follow its intended course. When this happens, by implication the PBDMD will have to 
find a way of dealing with the transaction costs that so concern them. In commenting on 
these transaction costs this politician had this to say: 
Ja, that’s true. But you know, nothing gets easily done... No, it’s 
like traffic fines, somebody has to do it… We’ve started building 




CONCLUSION – MUCH IS IN PLACE, BUT WITH LIMITED SYNERGIES 
 
The outcome is determined by the expectation that each player 
forms of how the other will play.… They must together find 
‘rules of the game’ or together suffer the consequences. 
(Schelling 1960: 106–107). 
 
As we have seen, the two different institutional cultures of the departments inevitably led 
to tensions, and these tensions led, in turn, in the case of the SWHB, to the two 
departments finding themselves at loggerheads.  
 
In the view of the PBDMD, the ERMD was made up largely of ‘activists’ (some of 
whom had learnt their trade outside of the City) with little understanding of the 
bureaucratic machinations of the CCT. Thus, from their perspective, the ERMD was 
inclined to barge into the policy fray in a heavy-handed manner where what was required 
was a careful and nuanced touch. On the other hand, the ERMD viewed the PBDMD as a 
‘bunch of bureaucrats’ more concerned with process than with getting things done (they 
favoured means over ends), and with putting up barriers to protect these processes.  
 
These mutually reinforcing perceptions led to what we might think of as a negative 
learning cycle. In this cycle each department looked for, and found, evidence in the 
actions of officials in the other department that confirmed their stereotypic view of the 
other unit. The more this happened, the more they saw evidence of these features. 
Accordingly, the more the departments interacted, the more they reinforced the 
caricatures they had created of each other.  
 
This ‘superstitious learning’ (White and Liu 1995), a psychological term for learning the 
wrong things, provided the basis for this ironic situation. Despite a shared commitment to 
reducing the carbon emissions of the CCT, the more they interacted the more they 
provoked behaviours that frustrated the realization of their shared objective. From the 
perspective of the ERMD, the SWHB was an internationally proven policy means that 
could, and should, have been implemented quickly to address an urgent policy objective 
shared across the CCT and supported by its politicians. For the ERMD, their job was to 
draft the by-law, fine-tune the drafting, and hand it over to an implementing department, 
in this case the PBDMD. This process was stymied by a multitude of largely unnecessary 
barriers blocking implementation. The solution, as they saw it, was to unblock the by-




From the vantage point of the PBDMD the situation was seen very differently. For them 
the SWHB was, and remains, a poorly considered policy means. The fact that it has not 
been implemented is a good, rather than bad, outcome. Accordingly, if there were 
barriers in place, that was a good, rather than bad, feature of the situation. These barriers 
were good because, had the by-law been implemented, it would have generated a 
negative impact on sustainability and a host of other objectives. 
 
The irony here is in fact deeper than it at first appears. As the literature makes clear, 
while collectively these two departments have some of the key ingredients that are 
required for successful implementation, they do not have them all. 
 
Gunderson et al. (1995) have argued that four different sets of players are needed for 
successful implementation of a policy initiative:  
§ activists who declare a crisis and invoke conflict;  
§ catalysts who frame alternatives;  
§ formal decision makers who have the powers to enact new policies; and  
§ officials who understand and appreciate implementation.  
 
According to Gunderson et al. (1995), if the mix of these elements is not properly 
aligned, or if some of the components are missing, one ends up with an all too familiar 
implementation paradox – shared objectives but an inability to put together a process that 
realizes them. This paradox is writ large in the case of the SWHB process. Most of the 
required elements of a successful process were in fact present, and yet the two 
departments ended up pulling in opposite directions. Not surprisingly, there was not 
much forward momentum regarding the SWHB or an alternative energy-reducing policy 
means.  
 
The key missing ingredient in the SWHB pie was Gunderson et al.’s catalysts – people 
who could work to convert a destructive engagement into one that was positive and 
constructive. Herein, too, lies both the challenge and the opportunity for the directorate 
that oversees both of these departments. 
 
Creating new synergies 
 
Converting policy into action requires that those charged with 
execution cooperate toward the achievement of the policy. 




Clearly, if the ‘green/low carbon emissions’ agendas within the CCT are to be 
successfully implemented it is important to establish, and nurture, a synergetic 
relationship between the ERMD and the PBDMD. As we have just suggested, there is 
much in place that can form the basis for this synergy – that is, for a shift from a negative 
cycle of progressive rounds of ‘superstitious learning’ to a positive cycle of productive 
learning. The ingredient missing from the mix, as set out by Gunderson, et al. (1995), was 
the absence of ‘catalysts who can frame alternatives’. It is to these catalysts that the 
directorate needs to look as it seeks to bring these two departments into closer alignment. 
 
When situations such as this are identified, a solution that is often put forward is to 
enhance communication. This is certainly an important ingredient, and a lack of 
appropriate communication was certainly a factor in the problematic process we have 
outlined in this chapter. However, while communication is a necessary and ameliorative 
ingredient, on its own it is insufficient because, through ‘superstitious learning’, 
communication can make matters worse. The critical questions are what forms of 
communication should be encouraged, how should they be facilitated, and how can this 
best be done?  
 
Before closing, it is necessary to return briefly to our theoretical framework – the study of 
implementation. Attempts to implement new environmentally friendly legislation 
confront established regulatory landscapes of legal principles and rules which protect 
practices that maintain a status quo economy. A key question arising from this research is 
how to identify green policy triggers or fulcra within the administrative system of the 
City that may facilitate a transition to a more environmentally friendly economy. At 
present the ‘action space’ for green policy initiatives in the City is not being optimally 
utilized. A key reason is the absence of synergies between the activist role and the 
institutionalist/regulatory role. And yet, the necessary ingredients for these synergies are 
available; the question is how to produce a productive mix.  
 
In response to both these questions, fortunately, there have been a number of more 
constructive and positive experiences within the CCT involving these two departments 
with respect to the implementation of ‘green’ agendas. These experiences provide the 
opportunity to articulate a set of ‘design principles’ (Ostrom 1990) for redesigning 
communications in ways that will enable the directorate to promote productive synergies 
between its departments. This challenge, given what we have learnt, is crucial, but need 
not be difficult if the directorate takes care to identify and build on the learnings that 
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